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In his most recent book A Natural History of 
Human Morality, Michael Tomasello analyzes the 
evolutionary history of human moral psychology. 
In this well-structured and easily understandable 
work, he employs the same two-step model that he 
proposed to explain human thinking in his 2014 
work A Natural History of Human Thinking. He 
starts from the assumption that morality is a 
species-unique form of cooperation made possible 
by the specific cognitive capacities humans are 
equipped with. His aim in this book is to provide 
an explanation of how changes in ecological 
conditions influenced the development of 
psychological traits which, based on the proximate 
mechanisms of cognition, social interaction and 
self-regulation, came to be associated with human 
feelings of sympathy and fairness, and led to 
increasingly complex forms of social organization 
and cooperation.  
This two-step approach hypothesizes an 
evolutionary escalation of cooperative models of 
social collaboration, based on an expanded sense of 
shared intentionality. Each step is signaled by a 
change in the ecological conditions for survival 
which in turn increased the degree of interde-
pendence between individuals, thereby requiring 
further adaptation of social organizational skills. 
The first step occurred because of the need for 
collaborative foraging which fostered a second-
personal sense of sympathy and fairness. The 
second step entailed the development of cultural 
practices and an agent-independent morality 
which enabled organization of the activities of the 
group for competition with other groups.  
In its most basic form, human morality is 
expressed through feelings of sympathy, which 
entail an altruistic interest in the well-being of 
others. These feelings originate in the parental care 
of offspring and can possibly be extended even to 
non-kin members. This is the most direct and 
simple form of cooperation: for a sympathetic act 
to occur, selfish motives must be overcome.  
The morality of fairness, on the other hand, is a 
more complex form of cooperation, requiring the 
achievement of a balance between cooperative and 
competitive motives among a number of indivi-
duals. The notion of “deservingness” is central, and 
it is accompanied by a series of attitudes aiming to 
praise or punish the behavior of others and the self.  
Tomasello’s analysis starts from a discussion of 
the “interdependence hypothesis”, i.e. the idea that 
the individual is embedded in a complex network of 
interdependencies, where each member depends on 
the success of the group for survival and 
reproduction. This helps him tackle the problem of 
finding an adequate psychological explanation for 
the causal origin of evolutionary stable forms of 
cooperation, such as kin and group selection, 
mutualism and reciprocity. Since reciprocal altruism 
fails to provide a plausible explanation for the 
reasons why an individual should act altruistically in 
the first place, since there is always the risk that an 
altruistic act may not be reciprocated, Tomasello 
proposes considering such prosocial behavior as a 
form of social investment in the future. Because 
humans are reciprocally interdependent, single 
altruistic acts are not motivated by the contingent 
recipient’s response. They are rather driven by an 
indirect advantage to the altruist who cares for the 
well-being of other group members whom she also 
depends on. 
The success of cooperative strategies also 
required the development of mechanisms of 
partner control, partner choice and social selection, 
in the attempt to punish or avoid non-cooperators. 
This process naturally favored the groups compo-
sed of more cooperative individuals.  
Tomasello begins his analysis by considering 
the last common ancestors of humans and other 
great apes, who lived around 6 million years ago. In 
order to explain the social life of our ancestors, he 
relies on experimental research on great apes such 
as chimpanzees and bonobos. Even though these 
species live in complex social groups, each indivi-
dual tries her best to outcompete the others in 
order to gain privileged access to resources by 
exerting her dominance. Collaborative efforts, 
therefore, are limited to those aiming to form 
strong coalitionary bonds with other individuals, 
both kin and nonkin, in order to provide support 
in social competition against other groups or 
within the same group, where the most desirable 
partner is simply the most dominant. Such bonding 
practices comprise preferential grooming and food 
sharing towards potential coalition partners, with 
the aim of fostering emotional reciprocity of 
sympathetic motives. The psychological traits of 
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cognition, social motivation and self-regulation 
that the motivational mechanism of sympathy 
requires for collaboration, were then developed for 
the ultimate purpose of competing for dominance. 
Since great apes depend on each other only in 
limited contexts, such as mating, there is no 
possibility for them to develop broader social skills. 
Even if a primitive form of sympathy is therefore 
present, experimental results show a complete lack 
of concern for fairness in dividing resources.  
Tomasello sets the first step towards the 
evolution of human morality around 2 million 
years ago, when early humans developed a more 
prosocial attitude due to the emergence of obligate 
collaborative foraging. In the absence of viable 
alternatives for survival, the hunting of large game 
led to an increased need for collaboration. Partner 
choice was directed towards those individuals who 
were most collaborative and helpful, since mem-
bers of these partnerships felt the instrumentally 
rational pressure to help each other in order to 
achieve their common interests.  
The kind of cooperation required to perform 
collaborative foraging activities was based on the 
joint intentionality of a collaborating dyad, based 
on a mutual sense of strategic trust. Their shared 
experience of focusing attention and efforts 
towards a common goal, created a personal 
common ground that defined the social 
relationship between the two individuals and 
provided them with the understanding that failing 
to perform what was required by each partner’s 
role-specific ideal simply meant joint failure.  
They thus formed what may be called a plural 
agent, sharing a sense of “we” that defined their 
role ideals in a partner-independent way. The 
capacity for role reversal allowed each partner to 
take the perspective of the plural agent, where each 
partner was equally important in terms of 
achieving their joint goal. Even though the reco-
gnition of self-other equivalence was not in itself a 
moral act, it served to shift the motivations for 
helping collaborative partners from strategic to 
more impartial ones, that involved a genuine care 
for their well-being, and formed the base for the 
development of a sense of fairness.  
The mechanism of selection of the most 
collaborative partners was thus driven by the 
evaluation of the social image that each individual 
created of themselves while cooperating with 
others. This process in turn produced a sense of 
personal identity, derived from the understanding 
that “I” am being evaluated in the same way that 
“I” evaluate others. Since each individual needed to 
be seen as a collaborative partner in order to 
survive, the most important way to express a 
second-personal commitment to a joint activity 
was by communicating to a potential partner the 
willingness to collaborate towards a joint goal, 
treating them with equal respect and deservingness 
while demanding the same. This kind of colla-
borative communication act allowed the formation 
of a joint commitment to the normative authority 
of the plural agent created by their shared goal. 
In this way, partners allowed each other to 
sanction unequal treatment and sub-optimal 
performance of the task role ideals defined in the 
name of the joint agent “we”, feeling such second-
personal protests to be legitimate. Not dividing the 
spoils fairly could be justified by “us” judging my 
poor performance, where “I” see this punishment 
as deserved and express my guilt if “I” want to 
retain my identity as a collaborative partner. The 
motivation behind an equal division of the spoils 
was thus motivated by a sense that responsibility 
and respect were due to the equally important 
partners in the context of a joint collaborative 
activity.  
In the course of this explanation, Tomasello 
frequently relies on empirical research with young 
children up to 3 years of age to show that children 
seem to display a basic form of fairness in per-
forming joint commitments. Similarly, he argues, 
early humans were capable of a basic second-
personal form of morality of sympathy and fairness 
towards collaborative partners. 
The last step in the evolution of human 
morality, according to the author, occurred around 
150,000 years ago, when different tribal groups 
began competing with each other and interde-
pendence played a broader role in the survival of 
modern humans. In this context, it was funda-
mental for each individual to clearly display their 
group identity, signaling their membership to a 
particular culture. Sympathy therefore evolved to a 
form of loyalty between individuals belonging to 
the same group, who displayed this identity via a 
shared cultural common-ground that defined their 
habits and particular ways of obtaining resources, 
communicating, and planning collective action.  
The organization of collective intentionality 
through such conventional cultural practices, 
values and beliefs, therefore, defined the cultural 
identity of the group, and led to an agent-
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independent perspective which established 
“objective” cultural role ideals, in the sense that 
every member belonging to that culture recognized 
them as a legitimate product of their co-
authorship. This “objective” character of cultural 
conventions clearly appeared in practices of 
intentional pedagogy, where an elder imparted 
shared epistemic notion about the particular ways 
of organizing activities in the cultural group with a 
younger member, speaking with the authoritative 
voice of the collective formation.  
The recognition of the “objective” status of 
cultural conventions promoted more complex 
forms of partner choice and control, performed 
through conventionalized forms of punishment 
that “objectively” established the good and the bad, 
anticipating conflicts and facilitating cooperation. 
The moral character of such norms was not 
inherent, but was instead grounded in second-
personal moral motives of sympathy and fairness. 
Conforming to social norms thus added an 
additional layer of motivation for cooperation 
beyond second-personal morality, providing the 
means for cultural identification and group 
coordination and control, especially in the form of 
cultural institutions. Moreover, the possibility for 
articulated linguistic exchanges allowed the group 
to keep track of an individual’s social reputation. 
Group members thus not only conformed to 
cultural norms, but also actively enforced them, 
punishing any violation on behalf of third parties.  
Additionally, these collective commitments 
legitimated cultural norms for moral self-
governance, creating a sense of obligation to the 
“objective” shared values and beliefs. Since 
uniformity of judgement, mine and others’, is the 
hallmark of a cultural sense of identity, members’ 
evaluation of each other’s conduct extended also to 
their own and others’ judgements. If an individual 
failed to live up to the cultural expectations tied to 
her role, her identity as an in-group member of that 
cultural group was at stake. In order to preserve it, 
she had either to show a sense of guilt, recognizing a 
fault in her previous judgement, or to provide a 
justification based on the group’s shared values. 
These mechanisms of self-regulation thus rendered 
cultural groups collective agents whose survival 
success depended on a higher organiza-tional 
ability than rival groups, leading to a process of 
cultural group selection. Starting from around 
12.000 years ago, when human groups adopted a 
sedentary lifestyle relying on agriculture as the 
main survival strategy, law and religion constituted 
additional means of cultural organization. This 
draws a picture of human morality based on the 
cooperative rational organization of shared 
intentional goals, motivated by different ecological 
and social conditions. 
In the last chapter of the book, Tomasello 
discusses the relationship between his theory and 
other approaches that address the same subject 
matter. He considers the views put forward by 
evolutionary ethics, moral psychology and gene-
culture coevolution, and provides a brief 
assessment of their limitations and how his 
proposal tries to overcome them.  
From a philosophical point of view, Tomasello’s 
evolutionary account of human moral psychology in 
terms of cooperative strategies and the notions they 
rely on is consistent with a metaethical con-
structivist theory. Such an approach could then 
arguably find a precious ally in the reconstruction 
offered by Tomasello, strengthening and 
broadening its arguments also on the basis of 
empirical evidence. 
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Il non-detto è un mago della parola: riesce a 
infiltrarsi laddove nessuna formula esplicita po-
trebbe arrivare. Nella realtà del quotidiano, impe-
gnati a concentrarci su ciò che c’è e che ci occupa 
già di per sé molto tempo, pochi di noi fissano 
sull’agenda appuntamenti con chi non c’è. La filo-
sofia del linguaggio esplora poco il non-detto: 
predilige concentrarsi su ciò che è presente e, per 
così dire, visibile nella comunicazione; a ciò che è 
assente, la cui importanza ha risvolti anche sul 
piano psicologico, dedica poco spazio di azione. 
È, invece, ciò che hanno fatto Filippo Domane-
schi e Carlo Penco nel loro ultimo saggio: hanno 
afferrato il non-detto alle prese con i suoi ma-
gheggi e l’hanno costretto a rivelarci qualcosa di 
più sui suoi meccanismi nascosti. 
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